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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Military Reaction to Middle East Developments

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In the fields of diplomacy and propaganda, the USSR's initial reaction to the landing of American forces in Lebanon has contained no warnings or hints of possible Soviet counteraction. Moscow's cautious warnings in the latter part of June that Soviet "volunteers" would be sent to oppose any Western military intervention in Lebanon have so far not been repeated. The main lines of the Soviet propaganda counterattack were

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set forth in the USSR's resolution in the UN Security Council, condemning the American action as a "grave threat to international peace and security," and calling on the United States to stop armed interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states and to withdraw its forces from Lebanon immediately.

Moscow is attempting to portray the landing in Lebanon as the first step toward "armed aggression against Iraq" and as part of a broader design to suppress the Arab "national liberation movement" throughout the Middle East. The USSR has already indicated support for the revolutionary regime in Baghdad by attempting to bloc the seating of the Iraqi delegate in the UN Security Council.

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### Kadar May Be Losing Control of Hungarian Regime

Hungarian party First Secretary Janos Kadar appears to have lost what little independent authority Moscow permitted him to exercise and may no longer fully control the Hungarian regime. Kadar's continued usefulness to the Kremlin has been in doubt since the Moscow-Belgrade rupture and particularly since the Nagy execution. His recent efforts to deny any culpability for his involvement in Nagy's short-lived government indicate the weakness of his present position.

The East German radio, after broadcasting a recording of Kadar's innocuous 12 July address at the East German party congress, added a blast against the Yugoslavs which the announcer attributed to Kadar. The addition included a pledge that "we do not tolerate revisionists in any field of social life, and least of all in the party." Kadar's remarks at the Budapest airport on 29 June on his return from Bulgaria reportedly were "thoroughly edited and doctored" before publication to remove his references to Yugoslavia, possibly because they were too mild. Publication of the speech had been held up for two days.

In Kadar's absence, his closest associate in Hungary, party secretary and politburo member Gyula Kallai, published an article in the party's daily newspaper on 13 July completely endorsing the position of the Stalinist wing of the party. This declaration, apparently a change of allegiance, ended with the ominous threat that they would "fight with all their strength against the still existing remnants of revisionism."

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